Why is Tim Wakefield's 72 mph fastball a "good pitch"?
Kevin Dame recently debuted his "Paintomatic" system of pitch selection visualization at Hardball Times. One of the findings that he reported as surprising was the fact that his fastball--all 72 mph of it--rates as "filthy" according to FanGraphs' pitch run values. The answer to why this is, of course, is context: a pitch's value depends on how often does he throw it, and what it is matched up against. The question this raises, of course, is the whether these pitch run values have any real meaning at all in an absolute sense.
They might not. This semester I'm teaching a baseball class, and one of the assignments a few weeks back was to read MGL's treatise on pitch selection that aired at FanGraphs last fall. His argument was essentially that the value of a pitch depends on how often you throw it. Throw it more often, the hitter comes to expect it and be able to react to it, and so the value of the pitch declines. Throw it less often, the pitch becomes more valuable. Overall, MGL argues, you should optimize your pitch selection such that the overall value of each pitch is equal.
As an exercise, I had my class go through the process of setting up a simple game theory model that lets us test the logic of this idea. Since pitch selection and game theory are topical right now, I thought I'd post what we came up with and see what folks think of it.
Because we were basing this on MGL's article, we used Brad Lidge as our case study. I told them that Brad Lidge's slider rates as a "75 pitch" on the scouting 20-80 scale, whereas his fastball was a "50 pitch." I then asked them to then fill in a table comparing outcomes based on batter expectation vs. pitcher pitch selection. Here's what they came up with:
| Lidge Throws | |||
| Fastball | Slider | ||
| Batter Expects | Fastball | -3 | 3 |
| Slider | 1.5 | -1.5 | |
The values are unitless, and are just chosen (by the students in this case) to give us something to work with. Think of them as a fraction of a run if you wish. Also, we're ignoring situations in batters "react" to a pitch, assuming that it will be somewhere in between these extreme situations.
So, if Lidge throws a slider, but the hitter guesses fastball, the hitter is essentially hopeless against it. Therefore, that combination gets a +3 value for Lidge, which we defined as the best possible value. On the other hand, if a hitter guesses slider and gets a slider, we said that he'd still be able to do something effective with this pitch: hence the -1.5 value. Fastball mirrored this effect, except that the fastball is a less good pitch, and therefore the best- and worst-case scenarios for the fastball are less good than the best- and worst-case scenarios for the slider, respectively.
Fair enough?
Relating the table to pitch frequency
Assuming random pitch expectation on the part of the batter, it makes sense for Lidge to throw nothing but sliders: better good-case outcome (+3), and better bad-case outcome (-1.5) than the fastball. On average, we'd expect average value of the slider to be (3-1.5)/2=+0.75.
However, if Lidge throws nothing but sliders, the batter is not going to keep guessing randomly. He's going to expect a slider every time. This shifts the value of the slider from +0.75 or so down toward -1.5 units. The same thing would happen if he tried to throw fastballs all the time. The relationship between pitch selection and pitch value can therefore be summarized in this figure:
The fastball's line is shifted downward because it's not as good of a pitch (in a vacuum). But as before, if you're throwing a slider all the time, it's value drops. And, if he's only throwing two pitches, as slider frequency increases (and its value decreases), the value of the fastball will increase because you are throwing it less.
Note on a big assumption here: I have no justification for assuming a linear change in pitch value. It very well could be extremely nonlinear, and may vary from pitcher to pitcher or pitch type to pitch type. I have no idea how to figure this out, short of doing an experiment in which I dictate pitch selection to a pitcher and monitor run values of different pitches. ... obviously not happening any time soon.
Optimizing pitch selection
So, how do you optimize pitch selection? There is probably an elegant mathmatical solution to this, but we took the brute force method: for any given combination of Fastball vs. Slider pitch frequencies, we multiplied the number of pitches of a particular type by its value (we did everything per 100 pitches). So:
Overall Pitch Selection Strategy Value = [#Fastballs * FastballValue] + [#Sliders * SliderValue]
Fastball and Slider values change with the frequency that the pitches are thrown per the graph above. This will allow us to find the strategy in which we minimize our negative consequences and maximize our positive consequences, an approach (as I understand it) known as MiniMax.
If we do this for each possible strategy, based on the (arbitrary) values and assumptions with which we set up our problem, we get the following distribution:
Pitch value is the horizontal axis here, while # fastballs thrown is the vertical (it matches the table I'll show below). Number of sliders would be [100 - #Fastballs]. What you can see is that the best overall value, based on all of our assumptions, comes when you throw the fastball 40 out of 100 times (40%). This means that you're throwing the slider 60% of the time. At that pitch selection strategy, the overall value of your 100 pitches is +6 units.
Here's a table showing all the pitch selection strategies we ran, the run value of the pitches involved, and the total values of the selection strategy:
| % Pitches Fastballs | Value Per Fastball | Value Per Slider | Fastball Value per 100 Pitches | Slider Value per 100 Pitches | Total Value of Pitch Selection Strategy |
| 100 | -3.00 | 3.00 | -300 | 0 | -300 |
| 95 | -2.78 | 2.78 | -264 | 14 | -250 |
| 90 | -2.55 | 2.55 | -230 | 26 | -204 |
| 85 | -2.33 | 2.33 | -198 | 35 | -163 |
| 80 | -2.10 | 2.10 | -168 | 42 | -126 |
| 75 | -1.88 | 1.88 | -141 | 47 | -94 |
| 70 | -1.65 | 1.65 | -116 | 50 | -66 |
| 65 | -1.43 | 1.43 | -93 | 50 | -43 |
| 60 | -1.20 | 1.20 | -72 | 48 | -24 |
| 55 | -0.98 | 0.98 | -54 | 44 | -10 |
| 50 | -0.75 | 0.75 | -38 | 38 | 0 |
| 45 | -0.53 | 0.53 | -24 | 29 | 5 |
| 40 | -0.30 | 0.30 | -12 | 18 | 6 |
| 35 | -0.08 | 0.08 | -3 | 5 | 2 |
| 30 | 0.15 | -0.15 | 5 | -11 | -6 |
| 25 | 0.38 | -0.38 | 9 | -28 | -19 |
| 20 | 0.60 | -0.60 | 12 | -48 | -36 |
| 15 | 0.83 | -0.83 | 12 | -70 | -58 |
| 10 | 1.05 | -1.05 | 11 | -95 | -84 |
| 5 | 1.28 | -1.28 | 6 | -121 | -115 |
| 0 | 1.50 | -1.50 | 0 | -150 | -150 |
Here's something interesting: based on this model and all of the assumptions going into it, the optimal pitch selection for Lidge (40% fastballs, 60% sliders) is NOT one that would have the pitch value of each pitch be exactly equal. That point (or the closest to it, as I just did 5% increments) is 35% fastballs, 65% sliders. The optimal strategy is very close to that point, but not exactly there. The reason is that, because in this case you're throwing sliders more frequently than fastballs, the extra boost to slider value that you get by throwing it slightly less often is worth more than the penalty you get by throwing your fastball slightly more often.
Obviously this conclusion is very dependent on our assumptions. The aforementioned issue of whether there's a linear change in pitch value with pitch frequency could be a big deal. And, of course, if you change the values in our initial table, the optimal pitch strategy changes.
Other scenarios
Actually, that last issue is sort of the point, right? What if I change the table to this:
| Lidge Throws | |||
| Fastball | Slider | ||
| Batter Expects | Fastball | -3 | 3 |
| Slider | 3 | -3 | |
This is essentially giving a situation in which the two pitches are exactly equal in quality.
If you do that, here's the distribution:
This indicates that if both pitches are of equal value (in best- and worst- case scenario conditions), that he should throw each exactly 50% of the time. Nice check, right? And yes, in this case, pitch values in the optimal strategy are exactly equal.
Let's do one more case, returning to Tim Wakefield and his 72 mph fastball:
| Wakefield Throws | |||
| Fastball | Knuckleball | ||
| Batter Expects | Fastball | -5 | 2 |
| Knuckleball | -2 | -1 | |
The way I've set this up is that the fastball is ALWAYS a poorer pitch than the knuckleball (this may or may not be true, but it makes for an interesting example, so bear with me). Even if a hitter is guessing knuckleball in this case, the fastball is so bad that you STILL get a better outcome by throwing a knuckleball instead of a fastball. The fastball's just that easy to hit. The value of the two pitches can NEVER be equal. Based on this, I expected that it would always be correct to throw the knuckleball, because you wouldn't want to expose your horrible "batting practice" style fastball to the hitter.
Well, let's plug it into the model:
This really surprised me. While the model certainly doesn't think that Wakefield should throw many fastballs, you still get a better overall outcome by throwing them ~15%-20% of the time! The reason? The increase in value to your knuckleball offsets the damage done by exposing your horrible fastball. At 15% fastballs/85% knuckleballs, the value of the fastball is -2.45 units, while the value of the knuckleball is -0.55 units. Definitely not equal. But this is where you get the best overall payoff.
Where do we go from here?
This is obviously not a very sophisticated model. It's basically a classroom exercise, designed primarily just to help students understand MGL's article. But based on the above work, I'll put forth the following conclusions (acknowledging that they are contingent on all kinds of assumptions that may break down upon closer examination):
- The fact that pitch value declines the more often you throw a pitch is key to understanding optimal pitch selection strategy. This, I think, was MGL's main point, and it absolutely stands.
- Pitch run values reported at FanGraphs are highly context dependent, and probably should not be used to judge the actual "quality" of a pitch. At least, not in an absolute "scouting" sense, without knowledge of pitch frequency and other pitches.
- It may not be the case that your best outcome occurs when pitch values are exactly equal. It will probably be close to this point, but it may be that you will adjust so that good pitches are thrown a bit less often than the "all pitches equal" point to bump up their value. This may explain why, for many pitchers, their "best pitches" (according to scouts) do often to have slightly positive run values while poorer pitches have lower run values. Maybe.
- Even if your best pitch's worst case scenario (hitter guesses it) is better than the best-case scenario of your secondary pitch (hitter guesses wrong), it still is probably worth it to mix in the occasional bad pitch to keep hitters from sitting on your best pitch too much. Even Mariano Rivera mixes in the occasional four-seamer (there's misclassification at that link, but see his horizontal vs. vertical movement plot--still some four-seam fastballs in the upper-left quadrant).
Can this model be made more realistic? Probably. We could certainly extend it to more than two pitch types. And we could try to get the inputs such that it is actually predictive. But I"m not sure how one would do that, as I'm relying on data that I don't think are measurable from game data. You could probably assume optimality on the part of the players and try to "work backwards" to get decent input values for pitches. But even then I'm not sure it would work. As a test of logic, though, I think this simple little model works pretty well. I'll be happy to hear your feedback and would welcome attempts to further this line of work, as I may not have time.
Also, if you're interested in playing around with it, here is the spreadsheet. Please just drop me a line and let me know if you use it to do something interesting. :)
Update: Based on discussion with David and Matt below, it looks like I missed a key point in not allowing batter and pitcher optima to vary independently--I more or less assumed that the batter would just latch onto whatever the pitcher was doing. That's ok, as the main points of this article hold. I think it still should be a nice way to help folks understand the relationship between pitch frequency and pitch value, and how that plays into pitch selection. But it is the case that conclusion #3 does not hold, because the way I was calculating optimum pitch strategy is flawed. Thanks to those guys for helping explain this stuff, as I understand it better now than when I started! :)
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This effect is similar to one well known in economics, why the division of labor in a free market works. Even if B is worse than A in all respects, A can focus on the things that A does marginally better and B can focus in the things that B does marginally better.
It's all about guns and butter baby.
And the lesson?
France sucks at everything!
Minimax
Hey Justin,
The elegant mathematical way to do it is that, from the hitter’s point of view, the outcomes must be equalized between Lidge throwing a fastball and a slider. So, if he throws his fastball with the probability p,
3*p – 3*(1 – p) = -1.5*p + 1.5*(1 – p)
If you do the math, p = 1/2. The hitter’s behavior, meanwhile, is governed by Lidge’s payoffs. If the hitter looks fastball with the probability q, then,
-3*q + 1.5*(1-q) = 3*q – 1.5*(1 – q)
So q = 1/3. So Lidge will throw his fastball 1/2 of the time, and hitter will look fastball 1/3 of the time.
Thanks David
I’ll need to read this two or three more times so i can get what you’re saying. All I’m seeing right now are p’s and q’s, which makes me think Hardy Weinberg Equilibrium. :)
I think what you’re saying is that the optimal pitch selection strategy is different from the optimal “looking” strategy on the part of the hitter. I’m not following why.
-j
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
The hitter reads the pitches differently
He wants a fastball because the pitch is bad, and doesn’t want the slider because the pitch is good.
If he knows the pitcher’s optimal frequency for each pitch, he can optimize his own production by sitting on the fastball just enough to make up for missing on more sliders.
Effectively, the batter really wants the fastball because it’s Lidge’s poorer pitch, so you sacrifice missing a few more sliders for the chance to whack a few extra fastballs.
Got it (at least qualitatively), thanks
Isn’t the consequence of this, however, that if you can expect the hitter to sit fastball a bit more often than the pitcher would throw sliders, the pitcher would want to counter this adjustment by throwing even more sliders? This might push us from the 40/60 split I found back down to the 35/65 split that the pitches-must-have-equal-values expectation would call for.
-j
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
Justin,
From the hitter’s perspective, we are in equilibrium when he is indifferent between the pitcher throwing a fastball or a slider (otherwise, he could benefit by looking for one more often). For him to be indifferent, the expected outcome from the pitcher throwing a fastball must be the same as the expected outcome from the pitcher throwing a slider. Remember that if the pitcher throws a fastball and the hitter is looking fastball, the hitter gets +3; if the pitcher throws a fastball and the hitter is looking slider, he gets -1.5; if the pitcher throws a slider, and the hitter is expecting a fastball, he gets -3; and if the pitcher throws a slider and the hitter is expecting a slider, he gets +1.5. So, for the hitter to be indifferent between seeing a fastball and a slider, if the pitcher throws his fastball with frequency p (and therefore his slider with frequency 1 – p),
3*p – 3*(1 – p) = -1.5*p + 1.5*(1 – p),
And p = 1/2. If the pitcher throws his fastball more than half the time, the hitter will sit on the fastball and if he throws it less than half the time, the hitter will sit on his slider. Only when the pitcher throws each pitch half the time is the hitter indifferent between the outcomes and are we at an equilibrium.
As for the hitter’s strategies, those depend conversely on the pitcher’s payoffs. The pitcher is at an equilibrium when he is indifferent between the hitter looking for a fastball or a slider (otherwise, he could benefit by throwing one more often). For him to be indifferent, the expected outcome from the hitter looking for a fastball must be the same as the expected outcome from the hitter looking for a slider. Remember that if the pitcher throws a fastball and the hitter is looking fastball, the pitcher gets -3; if the pitcher throws a fastball and the hitter is looking slider, he gets +1.5; if the pitcher throws a slider, and the hitter is expecting a fastball, he gets +3; and if the pitcher throws a slider and the hitter is expecting a slider, he gets -1.5. So, for the pitcher to be indifferent between throwing a fastball and a slider, if the hitter looks for his fastball with frequency q (and therefore his slider with frequency 1 – q),
-3*q + 1.5*(1-q) = 3*q – 1.5*(1 – q),
And q = 1/3. If the hitter looks for a fastball more than 1/3 of the time, the pitcher will feed him sliders and if he looks for it less than 1/3 of the time, the pitcher will feed him fastballs. Only when the hitter looks for the fastball 1/3 of the time is the pitcher indifferent between the outcomes and are we at an equilibrium.
Hope that makes things clearer. If not, I guess I wouldn’t make a great Intro to Game Theory teacher.
I really appreciate this article by Justin and David's chiming in
It helped me a ton to see the concrete numerical example of Lidge along with the graphs.
I might have to see if I can graph what David is saying in order to understand it, too.
Winner, Beyond the Box Score 32 Predictions Contest, 2009
Yeah
The best way to understand this is not to start off with the assumption that people are indifferent. It’s to deduce it the first few times.
We know that if Lidge’s strategy is to throw a fastball with probabilty p, the batter’s payoffs are:
Gunning for the fastball: 3p – 3(1-p) = 6p – 3
Gunning for the slider: -1.5p + 1.5(1-p) = 1.5 – 3p
We also know that if the hitter’s strategy is to gun for the fastball with probability q, then Lidge’s payoffs are:
Throw a fastball: -3q + 1.5(1-q) = 1.5 – 4.5q
Throw a slider: 3q – 1.5(1-q) = 4.5q – 1.5
So what you do is suppose that Lidge picked p such that 6p – 3 > 1.5 – 3p. If so, then the batter would gun for the fastball for sure. BUT THIS MEANS SETTING q = 1. If q=1, we know that 1.5q – 4.5(1-q) < 4.5q – 1.5. That means he would prefer to throw a slider, which means setting p = 0. BUT if p = 0, then it’s impossible for 6p – 3 > 1.5 – 3p!!! So there is NO equilibrium where 6p -3 > 1.5 -3p.
Follow the same logic and you’d find there is no equilibrium where 6p – 3 < 1.5 – 3p either because the batter would set q=0 in that case, and so Lidge would want p=1! What that means is in that any equilibrium where the batter and Lidge both don’t regret their strategies, they must be equal and p must be 1/2. Same logic would say q has to be 1/3.
It’s that there is any precise reason why Lidge is better off with p being 0.5 or 0.4 or 0.6 when q is 1/3. It’s just that p being 0.5 is the only way that the batter would pick q=0.333. Similarly, it’s not that the hitter is better off with q=0.333 versus q=0.233 or q=0.433. It’s just that that is the only way that p=0.5 works. It’s the only pairs of p,q values where the hitter and pitcher both don’t regret their strategies.
Not Minimax
Also, minor nitpick, but this isn’t MiniMax. MiniMax is when you find the best worst case scenario. It’s not really economics, it’s just a strategy. In this case, the worst case scenario for Lidge if he throws a fastball is -3. The worst case scenario if he throws a slider is -1.5. So Lidge would always throw sliders if he followed MiniMax. The batter’s worst case for gunning for the fastball is -3 and the worst case for gunning for a slider is -1.5. So the best of the worst case scenarios is gunning for the slider.
So in this equilibrium the batter always hits Lidge’s slider. You see why I don’t like minimax!!
I'm just not following, I guess.
What would help me is if one of you helpful people could compare your conclusions to the one by the brute force method I used above and explain with words why they are so apparently different. I guess it’s because I was assuming that the hitter would basically expect whatever the pitcher decides to do. Whereas you folks are expecting that the pitch frequency strategy optimum for a pitcher will be different than the optimal batter pitch expectation strategy.
I thought that the argument is that the hitter will bias toward more fastballs (since they are easier to hit). This would, in turn, prompt the pitcher to throw more sliders…? But that’s not what your equations are showing. Instead, they’re showing the pitcher opting to throw more fastballs than my approach argued he should (I said 40%, you guys are saying 50%). That’s because, I think, the hitter is hitter is better off expecting fastball just 1/3 of the time? And that’s because, otherwise, he’s getting killed by the slider when it is thrown? Am I getting close here?
-j
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
The hitter expects the pitcher to pick the probabilities that the pitcher does pick. It’s just that you need a hitter strategy. The hitter strategy is to prepare for one pitch or the other. If the hitter doesn’t have a strategy, it’s not really game theory, after all. They need to both have strategies. The hitter gets so killed by a slider if he gets it by surprise that he has to prepare for it more often. If he focused on it less than 2/3 of the time, Lidge would always throw the slider. But if he always threw sliders, the batter would obviously focus on it 100% the time. The hitter makes Lidge indifferent by sitting back and waiting on the slider frequently enough that Lidge has a good chance of buzzing a weak fastball by him.
Start with the strategies and the payoffs. Lidge’s payoff is 6 higher by throwing a surprise slider than an expected fastball but Lidge’s payoff is only 3 higher by throwing a surprise fastball than an expected slider. So if the hitter went 50/50, Lidge would just always throw sliders. The hitter needs to lean slider just enough that Lidge only gets that payoff that is 6 higher 1/2 as often as he gets the payoff that is 3 higher.
From the hitter’s perspective, his payoff is 4.5 higher if he leans fastball when a fastball is coming and 4.5 lower if he leans fastball when a slider is coming. So if Lidge threw the slider a little more often, the batter would should just always sit on it. But that’s not an equilibrium.
Does that help?
Sorry -- I confused the topic by being backwards in my explanation
Ignore my comment about taking advantage of more fastballs and listen to Matt.
Yes, definitely helps
So…presumably, it’s just a coincidence that Lidge’s optimum is 50/50, based on the payoffs I presented, right? That’s part of what was throwing me for a loop. With different sets of payoffs, the batter will go to a different pitch expectation strategy, which will prompt Lidge to vary away from 50/50. This HAS to be the case for the model to work, because quite obviously pitchers do not go 50/50 in most cases (though Lidge isn’t far from that).
Also, while we’re talking frequency, does MGL’s point about run value of pitches still hold? I’m having trouble getting back to that point from our discussion here.
I could work through the math and verify, but I’m unfortunately about to hop in the car for the weekend and have no time.
Thanks to everyone for the interesting discussion. I posted this knowing full well that I am not at all well-read in this topic and I’m finding this very interesting to learn more about.
-j
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
To answer your questions, Justin:
(1) There’s no reason Lidge’s optimum has to be 50/50. If the run values you presented were different, the optimum could well be different as well. For example, in the Wakefield example, the equilibrium occurs when Wakefield throws a fastball 1/8 of the time.
(2) MGL’s point holds — in fact, what Matt and I have been showing is essentially Mickey’s point. If Lidge throws his fastball 1/2 of the time and the hitter looks for it 1/3 of the time, the payoff on Lidge’s average fastball will be:
1/3*-3 + 2/3*1.5 = 0
Meanwhile, the payoff on his slider will be:
2/3*-1.5 + 1/3*3 = 0
As you can see, the payoffs are equal. That’s what you have to do: Set the payoffs from throwing each pitching as equal. That’s the only way to get to the optimum equilibrium.
Excellent, thanks.
Well, this has turned out fabulously. I get MGL’s paper better now than I did before. :)
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
Clarification
Just want to clear something up— you’re talking about the batter’s strategy as expecting. The batter does expect Lidge to go 50/50, but he leans 33/67 towards preparing for the slider. That might be where you’re getting confused. You’re assuming that the batter’s strategy is what to expect. It’s not. He has an expectation and a strategy. He expects that Lidge will throw sliders half the time. Knowing that, he expects that he’ll be more screwed if he guesses wrong on the slider so he prepares more often for the slider. That’s actually what batters do versus Lidge. They sit back on the slider and try to foul off fastballs. They know that they can’t foul off sliders when they have already leaned into the fastball.
Right, I'm following now
I’m probably going to try re-writing this to work correctly with all of your and David’s input. I think it can really work as a teaching piece with a few additions. I can probably do it graphically in a few more steps. I think it would be pretty valuable. -j
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
by JinAZ on Apr 3, 2010 6:13 PM EDT via mobile up reply actions
Damn, JinAZ.
Hell of an article.
This never happened, but I saw you leave
and crawl into a bed of broken windows.
Thanks. :)
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
next step: distribution-implied pitch quality
Using this approach, you can now a) infer pitch quality from actual pitch distribution, hence b) predict normalized, realized pitch-value measures and most interestingly c) compare predicted to realized pitch-value measurements.
Not easy, but I posit a nifty project. If someone with a bucket of money paid me to do it, I’d be game. Wish I had the time to do it for free..
This is exactly where Sky Andrecheck was going in his baseball analysts article
I agree that it has a lot more promise than pitch run values to determine pitch quality.
Another avenue that would be cool: fan scouting reports for pitch types! I’d love to see someone do this. With that info in hand, we could probably come up with some reasonable numbers to plug into the model, rather than the random crap* my students came up with.
-j
- I love how I can get away from taking personal responsibility for the arbitrariness of the numbers by just blaming it on my students. But this was probably the best class we had all semester, just behind the lineup one and the most recent one on curveballs/magnus force.
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
Thanks Tango for the link and kind words
I’m happy to sit back and let people pick this apart. David Gassko/Trickman seem to have a great insight above on where my model could be falling short.
-j
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
Amazing.
I love these types of things even if I don’t understand all the equations behind them. The graphs/Justin’s explanations helped. Really, really, really enjoyed this. I sometimes find MGL (and Tango) tough to read so I love it when someone breaks things down like this.
One thing that kept popping into my mind is weighing a 60/40 split on Lidge’s SL/FB with the stress throwing more sliders puts on the elbow. Such as, where’s the tipping point on putting the extra stress on the elbow out-weigh getting better results (especially for a reliever).
Great article. BtB comin’ through again.
My old blog is Tigers By The Numbers.
Now I write at Bless You Boys.
Like music? See what I'm listening to at my Last.fm account.
Also
I hope someone remembers this one for the “best ______” article polls on BtB next year.
My old blog is Tigers By The Numbers.
Now I write at Bless You Boys.
Like music? See what I'm listening to at my Last.fm account.
Based on Matt and David's comments above, I don't know if I'd support it for that
As it may have some fundamental flaws. But at least some of the basic concepts should still be helpful, even if all the conclusions don’t hold up exactly.
-j
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
Just getting to those comments now.
Prepared to not understand a thing, haha.
My old blog is Tigers By The Numbers.
Now I write at Bless You Boys.
Like music? See what I'm listening to at my Last.fm account.
Then you'll know how I feel!
Again, I think the main points hold. The exact optimum calculations may not, though, as I didn’t disentangle batter from pitcher optimums. This may mean that conclusion #3 may not hold (though I’m not sure about that yet).
If the main point is to help someone better understand MGL’s article (and that was the main point—as I said, this was a classroom exercise I came up with), I think it’s a nice little article.
-j
I write at:
Beyond the Boxscore | Red Reporter | Basement-Dwellers.com | Twitter: @jinazreds
The main points hold, I think.
I understood more of Matt/David’s comments than I thought I would (well, to the best that I could). It did what you hoped it would: I do understand MGL’s article more than I did when i read it at first when he posted it (I’m going to go back and read it sometime this weekend as a refresher to see if I ‘get it’ more now).
Either way, well done.
My old blog is Tigers By The Numbers.
Now I write at Bless You Boys.
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solving for the equilibrium
In the Brad Lidge game, this is how you solve for the Nash equilibria. The model I am using assumes that the batters payoff is the exact opposite of the pitchers and that the probability of a batter expecting a fastball is q and the probability of a pitcher throwing their fastball is p.
Batter:
U(p,q)=3pq-3q(1-p)-1.5(1-q)p+1.5(1-p)(1-q)
=9pq-4.5q-3p+1.5
=1.5-3p+q(9p-4.5)
Then the batter needs to maximize 9p-4.5 because that is the part of the equation that he can effect. 9p-4.5=0 or p=1/2 at the mixed strategy Nash equilbrium.
Pitcher:
U(p,q)=-3pq+3q(1-p)1.5(1-q)p-1.5(1-p)(1-q)
=-1.54.5q+p(3-9q)
= -1.5+4.5q+p(3-9q)
Using the same logic as above, the mixed strategy is q=1/3.
Therefore, the players strategies are:
{1; 0<=q<1/3
p(q)={[0,1]; q=1/3
{0; 1/3<q<=1
{0; 0<=p<1/2; q=0
q(p)={[0,1]; p=1/2
{q=1; 1/2<p<=1
When these equations are graphed out, it shows that there is only one solution: the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. This solution is at (p,q)=(1/2,1/3)
David & Matt beat you to the punch. :)
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by JinAZ on Apr 3, 2010 8:02 AM EDT via mobile up reply actions
Justin -- You trying to win you on SABRE Awards this year
Rec’d
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Thoughts
I’d think that the actual payouts of the table are going to change dramatically based on your percentage based on the “back of the head” idea. If you are throwing 40% fastballs, a hitter is never really going to sitting absolutely on a fastball, it’s in the back of his head that a slider can still come. So the run value of the hitter-fastball/pitcher-slider isn’t going to be as good (for the pitcher) as when the pitcher is throwing 95% fastballs—-the hitter really will mentally isolate that fastball and be totally worthless against a slider. I don’t have the game theory knowledge to deal with this though.
Not afraid to nitpick
I do have the game theory knowledge, but actually doing this is a nightmare and might not provide much additional value. It might. Think of the description in the comments above as “leaning” towards one pitch on the hitters part. The strategy isn’t to sit dead red on a fastball or to totally swing under the ball expecting a slider. You just bend your knees more or less or hold your hands back longer when the pitch looks a certain way.
The proper way to do it might actually entail Bayesian updating due to signals that of one pitch or another. The pitcher throws fastballs X% of the time. After the pitcher throws it, the batter gets a signal of either fastball or slider. If his signal is a slider, then he knows that there is still some percentage (less than X% but greater than 0%) that his signal is wrong and it’s actually a fastball. If his signal is a fastball, then he knows that there is still some chance it’s a slider (so the odds of a fastball are less than 100% but greater than X%). The hitter chooses to either gun for the fastball or slider as a function of his signal, by optimizing his decision in each case. You reverse induce the pitchers probabilities based on this. I could work my way through it, but even describing the method is giving me Prelim Exam flashbacks that are violent enough that I won’t bother at least for now. If someone wants to try and email me questions, feel free. It’s at gmail, and the name is matthewTswartz.
Great article, Justin
As a current Economics major at USC looking to get into the business of baseball, I always appreciate efforts to meld the two, both on-field, as your article does, or on the business side of the game, which Dave Cameron has done, with his “Marginal Value of a Win”. Having read your article and the subsequent comments by the posters here, several questions come to mind. 1) Now that we know the optimal distributions of the pitches for the pitchers, how do we arrive at the optimal pitch sequencing? 2) If, through the great work that you, MGL, David, etc. are analyzing, we do arrive at the optimal pitch sequence for a pitcher, how do we adjust for the hitter changing his expectation to the pitcher’s optimal sequence? 3) Are we ever even going to be able to get to that point? This model assumes that we know the batter’s payoff against a certain pitcher, and though we have the empirical data for that, it is almost certainly a small sample size and almost certainly does not reflect the “true” payoff.
I apologize if these questions are basic; my knowledge of game theory isn’t great. I understand payoffs, Winner’s Curse, Prisoner’s Delemma, etc., but haven’t had experience with adding numbers and other conditions yet. I have been aching for a book or collection of articles that can relate Economics and game theory, with the aim of preparing myself for a future career; I understand that you are a professor that teachers Sabrmetrics: Do you have any suggested readings that could help me out? I have just recently obtained an internship with the Seattle Mariners for the summer, and any more knowledge I can cram into my brain before then would be great.
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